There were many factors – as there always are – which have to be understood when trying to understand German foreign policy at the beginning of the last century. Although we will mention some of the other influences upon foreign policy making in Germany at the start of the century, this essay will primarily explore the importance of social factors.
The essay will look at the period leading up to 1914, and thus we will be effectively also asking what role social factors played in leading Germany into the First World War in August, 1914.
We shall be asking whether it is simply of a case of social factors affecting domestic politics in Germany, which then itself affects the implementation of foreign policy. This will involve a detailed look at the debate which often rages, about the linkage between domestic and foreign policy; ‘Primat der Aussenpolitik Vs Primat der Innenpolitik’. This is really more of an indirect effect of social factors upon foreign policy.
Or is there a case to be put which explains foreign policy decisions taken at the top as being direct results of pressures coming from below, in the population itself – a kind of “bottom-up” explanation of foreign policy?
Included in this will be a look at the rise of the Social Democratic party and an examination of the impact they made in Germany during this period.
In order to place this argument in a wider context, we will then go on to make a comparison with the ‘external’ explanations, which argue for the ‘Primacy of Foreign Policy” - a phrase coined by the nineteenth-century German historian Leopold Von Ranke.
By analysing the events and the issues in Germany between 1900-1914, this essay hopes to be able to explain the importance of social factors, in gaining an understanding of German foreign policy at this time.
Before we can explore the influences upon it, it is vital that we firstly get a grip on what exactly German foreign policy in this period was. The period we are looking at ends in August 1914 with the outbreak of a war which was to prove so damaging to Germany, and this will obviously shape our investigation.
There was a definitive shift in German foreign policy at the very end of the nineteenth century under Kaiser Wilhelm II. Germany now started to pursue a far more aggressive, expansionist policy than before, defined as Weltpolitik , which was said to aim “at nothing less than ‘parity with the British world empire”. This has been correctly described as “a clear dividing line in German foreign policy”.
One of the most important factors of Weltpolitik was the massive increase in German naval building which aimed to create sea power to compete with that of Great Britain, the undisputed leading naval power in the world at that time. Up until 1897, the Kaiser had struggled to get the Reichstag to approve enough money to substantially increase the size of the navy. The Reichstag had been unwilling as the army was still considered the mainstay of German defence.
This changed however with the appointment of Alfred Tirpitz as naval minister in 1897. Tirpitz put forward a long-term strategic plan, and the Reichstag passed the first naval law. Three years later, another naval law was passed which aimed to double the size of the navy by 1907. Further increases were voted through in 1906,1908 and 1912.
This new foreign policy seems especially offensive minded , when compared to the policy pursued by Bismarck (who had been so revered in Germany for ‘putting the Second Reich together’ ) which had been essentially defensive between 1871 and 1890.
However, the Kaiser and his advisers were convinced that Germany had to expand in order to remain strong, and this shaped foreign policy right up until 1914. The question we must now ask is; “Why Weltpolitik?” and what role did social factors play in shaping this policy.
The personal role played by the Kaiser cannot be ignored when considering this. It has been suggested the Kaiser’s motives for pushing through the naval increases were two-fold. Firstly, that he needed to show that Germany could be the equal of England for reasons of personal prestige, and secondly that he had been heavily influenced by a book by Alfred Mahan about the influence of naval power on history.
Also, there is an argument which says that Weltpolitik was a policy born out of a fear of encirclement by hostile powers, a fear which only grew when Great Britain signed ententes with Japan, France and Russia (In 1902,1904 and 1907 respectively):
“. In 1912 German Commander-in-Chief, von Moltke, told the Kaiser that ‘war is inevitable and the sooner the better’”.
This view holds that Germany’s decision to pursue such an aggressive policy was primarily a defensive one, and one which really has little to do with Germany’s internal affairs.
Counter to this argument, although still one which has little to do with domestic politics is that Germany’s foreign policy during this period was aimed at a “positive pursuit of world power”. To summarise this view, which tends to be very critical of Germany, it is said that an aggressive and reckless policy was implemented by the German ruling elite, one which necessarily involved conflict with other powers, in order to establish Germany as one of the Great Powers.
Those who concentrate more on the importance of domestic politics have said that the reason for Weltpolitik lies here. A good starting point for this view, is a quote by one of Kaiser Wilhelm’s advisers that:
“Reactionary governments always try to divert the internal struggle to the foreign sphere”.
It is argued that following their failure to effectively suppress socialism, the government wished to bring the working classes onside “through integrative nationalism, passion for overseas expansion, and concern for national prestige”. Certainly, if this was their main aim, then it was successful as the navy building:
“led to the creation of a body of nationalist opinion and the development of an aggressive imperialist rhetoric which contributes to making war seem acceptable and even desirable”.
We shall now take a more detailed look at Germany’s domestic affairs at this time.
In the 25 years leading up to the outbreak of war in 1914, the German population grew from under 50 million to almost 68 million people. The type of employment was also changing due to rapid industrialisation, with the percentage of the workforce in secondary and tertiary industries, greatly increasing. This all resulted in a new class society in Germany, with the birth of a huge working-class congregated in the cities.
The socialist Social Democratic Party (SPD), founded in 1875, became the major political representative of this new class , and started to make headway in elections to the Reichstag, gaining a majority in the elections of January 1912.
However in contrast to the demographics of the country, the German political system had not changed and the nation was “still governed by a very narrow social elite: the Kaiser and the ministers that he, and not the Reichstag, appointed”. Thus the SDP was constantly unable to exert any substantial influence on actual legislation.
Yet it was obvious that the status quo could not remain in the face of this social change, and with the rise of the SPD, unless the German government decisive action. One of the ways to do this, was to create a mood of anti-socialism in the country through the pursuance of nationalist policies – which obviously risked war - which would appeal to a broad spectrum of Germans , in ways both economically (through the naval programme) and ideologically.
James Joll summarises the argument made by ‘Domestic Policy’ historians excellently:
“foreign policy was deliberately used as a means of manipulating public opinion so as to create a sense of solidarity among the German people and overcome the social and political divisions which were seen as a threat to the very existence of the German empire”.
This view has much substance, especially when we look at comments coming out of the ‘Right’ media at the time, such as:
“A fresh and uninhibited war would immediately decimate the 110 Social Democrats in the Reichstag”.
Certainly, the view was also held in German ruling elite circles that “a war was likely to have a healthy effect on German national character”.
The role of the SDP is interesting, as by the 4th August 1914, the party in the Reichstag were voting for the war funds required by Germany., and by the following year were ‘on-side’ with the German government. Do we simply conclude that the national mood whipped up by the German elite was responsible for this?
This is not the place to fully examine the reasons for the Social Democrats behaviour, and the SDP had never been against national defence anyway , yet it seems strangely ironic that a government which had done much to create anti-Socialist sentiment using its foreign policy, ended up with Socialist support for its foreign policy anyway.
So, social factors clearly played a part in the development of German foreign policy from 1900-1914, but how important a part is the question we will now focus on as we reach the end of this essay.
It has been proven that domestic politics did play a role in Germany’s foreign policy at the start of the twentieth century, yet it would be wrong to argue that Germany’s decision to go to war in 1914 was the result of domestic pressures alone.
Many have argued that Germany’s decision was a “death or glory” one, with the choice being between foreign war, and civil war at home. However, this is to attach little significance to the other factors which had shaped policy in the years leading up to this point.
This essay accepts the argument that social factors were important in shaping German foreign policy at this time, yet believes they were still of secondary importance compared to the German government’s quest for world power for positive reasons. Such a quest would necessitate war with other powers, and the result was the Weltpolitik (complete with navy building) of the early twentieth century.